Democratizing Constitutional Law: Perspectives On Legal Theory And The Legitimacy Of Constitutionalism (law And Philosophy Library)
by Thomas Bustamante /
2016 / English / PDF
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This volume critically discusses the relationship between democracy
and constitutionalism. It does so with a view to respond to
objections raised by legal and political philosophers who are
sceptical of judicial review based on the assumption that judicial
review is an undemocratic institution. The book builds on earlier
literature on the moral justification of the authority of
constitutional courts, and on the current attempts to develop a
system on “weak judicial review”. Although different in their
approach, the chapters all focus on devising institutions,
procedures and, in a more abstract way, normative conceptions to
democratize constitutional law. These democratizing strategies may
vary from a radical objection to the institution of judicial
review, to a more modest proposal to justify the authority of
constitutional courts in their “deliberative performance” or to
create constitutional juries that may be more aware of a
community’s constitutional morality than constitutional courts
are. The book connects abstract theoretical discussions about
the moral justification of constitutionalism with concrete
problems, such as the relation between constitutional adjudication
and deliberative democracy, the legitimacy of judicial review in
international institutions, the need to create new institutions to
democratize constitutionalism, the connections between
philosophical conceptions and constitutional practices, the
judicial review of constitutional amendments, and the criticism on
strong judicial review.
This volume critically discusses the relationship between democracy
and constitutionalism. It does so with a view to respond to
objections raised by legal and political philosophers who are
sceptical of judicial review based on the assumption that judicial
review is an undemocratic institution. The book builds on earlier
literature on the moral justification of the authority of
constitutional courts, and on the current attempts to develop a
system on “weak judicial review”. Although different in their
approach, the chapters all focus on devising institutions,
procedures and, in a more abstract way, normative conceptions to
democratize constitutional law. These democratizing strategies may
vary from a radical objection to the institution of judicial
review, to a more modest proposal to justify the authority of
constitutional courts in their “deliberative performance” or to
create constitutional juries that may be more aware of a
community’s constitutional morality than constitutional courts
are. The book connects abstract theoretical discussions about
the moral justification of constitutionalism with concrete
problems, such as the relation between constitutional adjudication
and deliberative democracy, the legitimacy of judicial review in
international institutions, the need to create new institutions to
democratize constitutionalism, the connections between
philosophical conceptions and constitutional practices, the
judicial review of constitutional amendments, and the criticism on
strong judicial review.