In Defense Of Shame: The Faces Of An Emotion
by Julien A. Deonna /
2011 / English / PDF
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Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic
emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology,
philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the
nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and
moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything
worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and
political applications?
Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic
emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology,
philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the
nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and
moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything
worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and
political applications?
In this book, Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice
Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at
answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed
examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support
what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social
nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is
conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and
ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this
account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that
the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with
regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of
the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in
which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding
light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a
sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
In this book, Julien A. Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice
Teroni propose an original philosophical account of shame aimed at
answering these questions. The book begins with a detailed
examination of the evidence and arguments that are taken to support
what they call the two dogmas about shame: its alleged social
nature and its morally dubious character. Their analysis is
conducted against the backdrop of a novel account of shame and
ultimately leads to the rejection of these two dogmas. On this
account, shame involves a specific form of negative evaluation that
the subject takes towards herself: a verdict of incapacity with
regard to values to which she is attached. One central virtue of
the account resides in the subtle manner it clarifies the ways in
which the subject's identity is at stake in shame, thus shedding
light on many aspects of this complex emotion and allowing for a
sophisticated understanding of its moral significance.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current
debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied
as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary
psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics
and public policy.
This philosophical account of shame engages with all the current
debates on shame as they are conducted within disciplines as varied
as ethics, moral, experimental, developmental and evolutionary
psychology, anthropology, legal studies, feminist studies, politics
and public policy.