Pragmatics And Law: Philosophical Perspectives (perspectives In Pragmatics, Philosophy & Psychology)
by Alessandro Capone /
2016 / English / PDF
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This volume highlights important aspects of the complex
relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts
an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science,
philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an
international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine
this new debate.
This volume highlights important aspects of the complex
relationship between common language and legal practice. It hosts
an interdisciplinary discussion between cognitive science,
philosophy of language and philosophy of law, in which an
international group of authors aims to promote, enrich and refine
this new debate.
Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in
cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find
tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was
reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science and philosophy
of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their
theses.
Philosophers of law have always shown a keen interest in
cognitive science and philosophy of language in order to find
tools to solve their problems: recently this interest was
reciprocated and scholars from cognitive science and philosophy
of language now look to the law as a testing ground for their
theses.
Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics,
sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an
interdisciplinary, international group of authors address
questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary
understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to
legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of
law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal
disagreements?
Using the most sophisticated tools available to pragmatics,
sociolinguistics, cognitive sciences and legal theory, an
interdisciplinary, international group of authors address
questions like: Does legal interpretation differ from ordinary
understanding? Is the common pragmatic apparatus appropriate to
legal practice? What can pragmatics teach about the concept of
law and pervasive legal phenomena such as testimony or legal
disagreements?