Game Theory And Public Policy, Second Edition
by Roger A. McCain /
2016 / English / PDF
3.5 MB Download
Building on the success of the first edition,
Building on the success of the first edition,Game Theory and
Public Policy, Second Edition
Game Theory and
Public Policy, Second Edition provides a critical, selective
review of key concepts in game theory with a view to their
applications in public policy. The author further suggests
modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game
theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public
policy.
provides a critical, selective
review of key concepts in game theory with a view to their
applications in public policy. The author further suggests
modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game
theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public
policy.
Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory for
the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring
potential solutions, providing a toolkit for the analysis of
public policy allowing for a clearer understanding of the public
policy enterprise itself. His critical review of major topics
from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory includes
less-known ideas and constructive proposals for new approaches.
This revised edition features a new second half that focuses on
biform games, combining cooperative and non-cooperative decisions
in a simple and natural way to provide a working model of
externalities that can be applied to issues such as monopoly
policy and labor market policies.
Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory for
the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring
potential solutions, providing a toolkit for the analysis of
public policy allowing for a clearer understanding of the public
policy enterprise itself. His critical review of major topics
from both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory includes
less-known ideas and constructive proposals for new approaches.
This revised edition features a new second half that focuses on
biform games, combining cooperative and non-cooperative decisions
in a simple and natural way to provide a working model of
externalities that can be applied to issues such as monopoly
policy and labor market policies.
Drawing on comparatively well understood models in cooperative
game theory and the author's own research on mathematical models
of biform games, this unique approach and treatment of game
theory, updated and expanded to stay on the cutting edge, will be
a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and
public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves.
Drawing on comparatively well understood models in cooperative
game theory and the author's own research on mathematical models
of biform games, this unique approach and treatment of game
theory, updated and expanded to stay on the cutting edge, will be
a useful resource for students and scholars of economics and
public policy, as well as for policymakers themselves.