Logical Studies Of Paraconsistent Reasoning In Science And Mathematics (trends In Logic)
by Holger Andreas /
2016 / English / PDF
2.3 MB Download
This book covers work written by leading scholars from different
schools within the research area of paraconsistency. The authors
critically investigate how contemporary paraconsistent logics can
be used to better understand human reasoning in science and
mathematics. Offering a variety of perspectives, they shed a new
light on the question of whether paraconsistent logics can function
as the underlying logics of inconsistent but useful scientific and
mathematical theories. The great variety of paraconsistent logics
gives rise to various, interrelated questions, such as what are the
desiderata a paraconsistent logic should satisfy, is there prospect
of a universal approach to paraconsistent reasoning with axiomatic
theories, and to what extent is reasoning about sets structurally
analogous to reasoning about truth. Furthermore, the authors
consider paraconsistent logic’s status as either a normative or
descriptive discipline (or one which falls in between) and which
inconsistent but non-trivial axiomatic theories are well understood
by which types of paraconsistent approaches. This volume addresses
such questions from different perspectives in order to (i) obtain a
representative overview of the state of the art in the
philosophical debate on paraconsistency, (ii) come up with fresh
ideas for the future of paraconsistency, and most importantly (iii)
provide paraconsistent logic with a stronger philosophical
foundation, taking into account the developments within the
different schools of paraconsistency.
This book covers work written by leading scholars from different
schools within the research area of paraconsistency. The authors
critically investigate how contemporary paraconsistent logics can
be used to better understand human reasoning in science and
mathematics. Offering a variety of perspectives, they shed a new
light on the question of whether paraconsistent logics can function
as the underlying logics of inconsistent but useful scientific and
mathematical theories. The great variety of paraconsistent logics
gives rise to various, interrelated questions, such as what are the
desiderata a paraconsistent logic should satisfy, is there prospect
of a universal approach to paraconsistent reasoning with axiomatic
theories, and to what extent is reasoning about sets structurally
analogous to reasoning about truth. Furthermore, the authors
consider paraconsistent logic’s status as either a normative or
descriptive discipline (or one which falls in between) and which
inconsistent but non-trivial axiomatic theories are well understood
by which types of paraconsistent approaches. This volume addresses
such questions from different perspectives in order to (i) obtain a
representative overview of the state of the art in the
philosophical debate on paraconsistency, (ii) come up with fresh
ideas for the future of paraconsistency, and most importantly (iii)
provide paraconsistent logic with a stronger philosophical
foundation, taking into account the developments within the
different schools of paraconsistency.