Democracy And Coercive Diplomacy (cambridge Studies In International Relations)
by Kenneth A. Schultz /
2001 / English / PDF
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Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on coercive
diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between
government and opposition parties influences threats in
international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and
whether or not crises can be settled short of war. Compared to
their nondemocratic counterparts, democracies make threats more
selectively, but those they do make are more likely to be
successful--that is, to gain a favorable outcome without war.
Schultz uses game-theoretic models and tests the resulting
hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case
studies.
Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on coercive
diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between
government and opposition parties influences threats in
international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and
whether or not crises can be settled short of war. Compared to
their nondemocratic counterparts, democracies make threats more
selectively, but those they do make are more likely to be
successful--that is, to gain a favorable outcome without war.
Schultz uses game-theoretic models and tests the resulting
hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case
studies.
