Oil Is Not A Curse: Ownership Structure And Institutions In Soviet Successor States (cambridge Studies In Comparative Politics)
by Pauline Jones Luong /
2010 / English / PDF
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This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states
are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership
structure they chose to manage their mineral wealth and second,
that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states.
Each represents a significant departure from the conventional
resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as
a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich
countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong
institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the
five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their
respective developmental trajectories since independence
demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across
countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that
this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent
fiscal regimes.
This book makes two central claims: first, that mineral-rich states
are cursed not by their wealth but, rather, by the ownership
structure they chose to manage their mineral wealth and second,
that weak institutions are not inevitable in mineral-rich states.
Each represents a significant departure from the conventional
resource curse literature, which has treated ownership structure as
a constant across time and space and has presumed that mineral-rich
countries are incapable of either building or sustaining strong
institutions - particularly fiscal regimes. The experience of the
five petroleum-rich Soviet successor states (Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan)
provides a clear challenge to both of these assumptions. Their
respective developmental trajectories since independence
demonstrate not only that ownership structure can vary even across
countries that share the same institutional legacy but also that
this variation helps to explain the divergence in their subsequent
fiscal regimes.
