Relative Truth
by Manuel García-Carpintero /
2008 / English / PDF
1.9 MB Download
The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these
factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered, the
context in which the utterance was made, and the way things are in
the world. Recently, however, a number of cases have been discussed
where there seems to be reason to think that the truth of an
utterance is not yet fully determined by these three factors, and
that truth must therefore depend on a further factor. The most
prominent examples include utterances about values, utterances
attributing knowledge, utterances that state that something is
probable or epistemically possible, and utterances about the
contingent future. In these cases, some have argued, the standard
picture needs to be modified to admit extra truth-determining
factors, and there is further controversy about the exact role of
any such extra factors.
The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these
factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered, the
context in which the utterance was made, and the way things are in
the world. Recently, however, a number of cases have been discussed
where there seems to be reason to think that the truth of an
utterance is not yet fully determined by these three factors, and
that truth must therefore depend on a further factor. The most
prominent examples include utterances about values, utterances
attributing knowledge, utterances that state that something is
probable or epistemically possible, and utterances about the
contingent future. In these cases, some have argued, the standard
picture needs to be modified to admit extra truth-determining
factors, and there is further controversy about the exact role of
any such extra factors.
With contributions from some of the key figures in the contemporary
debate on relativism this book is about a topic that is the focus
of much traditional and current interest: whether truth is relative
to standards of taste, values, or subjective informational states.
It is an issue in the philosophy of language, but one with
important connections to other areas of philosophy, such as
meta-ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.
With contributions from some of the key figures in the contemporary
debate on relativism this book is about a topic that is the focus
of much traditional and current interest: whether truth is relative
to standards of taste, values, or subjective informational states.
It is an issue in the philosophy of language, but one with
important connections to other areas of philosophy, such as
meta-ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.